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JUDICIAL SELECTION IN NORTH DAKOTA-
IS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION NECESSARY?
INTRODUCTION
For years legal scholars, social scientists and politicians have
debated the controversial question of judicial selection.' Basically,
the issue is and has been whether judicial selection should be by
an elective or appointment method. The extensive consideration
that should be given to the method of selecting our judiciary can
be realized by considering the character of our judiciary system.
Former Associate Justice Tom Clark of the United States Supreme
Court has written:
Justice is everybody's business. . . . It affects every man's
fireside; it passes on his property, his reputation, his liberty,
his life; yes, his all! Courts sit to determine cases on stormy
as well as calm days. We must therefore build them on solid
ground, for if the judicial power fails good government is
at an end.
2
Another writer has observed:
If justice is to be administered effectively, we must have
fair and impartial judges who, in the words of Socrates,
hear courteously, answer wisely, consider soberly, and decide
impartially. The selection of judges, therefore, is all impor-
tant."
This note will examine the history of judicial selection in the
United States, the arguments for either the appointive or elective
method of judicial selection, and finally, an evaluation of the North
Dakota judicial selection procedure.
4
1. E.g., Gutman, In The Matter of Judicial Selection: Who W4ll Win, 53 JUD. 114
(1969); Voorhees, Stake of the Profession in Judicial Selection, 53 JUD. 146 (1969);
Reagan, Traynor, Grinsky, Bagley, & Finger, California Merit Plan for Judicial Selection,
43 CALIF. S.B.J. 156 (1968); Henderson & Sinclair, Selection of Judges in Texas, 5
Hous. L. REv. 430 (1968) ; Garwood, Democracy & the Popular Election of Judges: An
Argument, 16 Sw. L. J. 216 (1962).
2. Sutro, Merits of the Merit Plan Judicial Selection, in SELECTED READnas: JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE 154 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
3. Id.
4. Other matters affecting the judiciary such as tenure, removal of judges, and Juris-
diction of our state courts will not be discussed although they too are important for a
modern and efficient court system. Associate Professor Richard B. Kuhns, University of
North-Dakota School of Law, examines these areas of the North Dakota Judiciary in his
article which appears at 48 N.D. L. Rav. 219 (1971). This note will also confine itself
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the first state constitutions, most judges were selected by
appointment of the governors or the legislatures, with these appoint-
ments being subject to some type of control by a judicial council. 5
In fact, the first twenty-nine states entering the union called for
their judiciary to be appointed. 6
With the advent of "Jacksonian Democracy" during the 1830's,
citizens began to feel that the people should elect almost all public
officials, including judges.7 Mississippi became the first state to
have a completely elected state judiciary by adopting the election
system in 1832. However, it was not until 1846 when the New
York Constitutional Convention substituted popular election for ap-
pointment that the era of elected judges in this country began. By
the end of the 1860's, twenty-five states provided for an elected
judiciary.8 And from the 1860's until the admission of Alaska in
1958, each new member of the union adopted the elective concept.9
North Dakota was among these states advocating an elected judiciary
when it became a state in 1889."0
By the end of the nineteenth century, dissatisfaction and disen-
chantment with the elective method had set in. In 1906, Roscoe
Pound stated:
Putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to be-
come politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed
the traditional respect for the bench.1
Joining the cause in a speech to the American Bar Association
in 1913, former President William Howard Taft severely criticized
partisan and nonpartisan elections. The basis of Taft's criticism
to the selecticp of the North Dakota judiciary and will not attempt to analyze the se-
lection process of our federal judiciary.
5. E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80-135 (1944).
6. Id,
7. A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON ch. XXV (1945).
8. REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, 89TH LEGISLA-
TIVE ASSEMBLY 46 (1965).
9. However, the two latest states admitted to the Union, Alaska and Hawaii, both
provide for an appointed judiciary. Hawaii allows the executive to make the appointments
while Alaska follows the Merit Plan of appointment The Merit Plan referred to has
several other names. It is called the Missouri Plan after the first state to use it, the
American Bar Association Plan, after ABA endorsement of it in 1937, the American Judi-
cature Society Plan and the Kales Plan. For the purpose of this note, it shall be known
as the Merit Plan unless otherwise indicated.
10. E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 124 (1944). Before North Dakota
became a state, there were no elected judges or Justices of any courts of record. Rather,
the judges for the Dakota Territory were all appointed by the President of the United
States. REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTSs, 39TH LEGISLA-
TIVE ASSEMBLY 46, 47 (1965).
11. This statement occurred in a speech entitled The Causea of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, which is reprinted in 46 J. AM. JUm. Soc'Y. 55, *66
(1962).
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was that unqualified persons could run entirely on their own and
get elected through aggressive campaigning.
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In that same year the American Judicature Society advocated
a return to the appointment method by sponsoring the nonpartisan
appointive-elective plan, better known today as the Merit Plan.'1
Formulated first by Professor Albert M. Kales of Northwestern
University, the Merit Plan was given the official endorsement by
the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1937. The
essentials of the Merit Plan are:
(1) Nomination of qualified judicial candidates by a non-
political commission or council composed of members
of the legal profession and laymen. (Selection essential)
(2) Appointment of judges to fill judicial vacancies by an
elected official. (Appointment essential)
(3) Tenure by non-political vote of the people that calls
only for voter approval or disapproval of a judges' rec-
ord. If a judge's record is approved, the judge continues
in office for another term, but if disapproved, another
judge is appointed. 4 (Tenure essential)
In 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt the essential
provisions of the Merit Plan for most but not all of its appellate
and trial bench. 15 Maryland in the same year adopted the "tenure
essential" for the People's Court of Baltimore City. The decade
of the 1950's found the Merit Plan being adopted for the trial and
appellate courts of Alaska, for the Supreme Court of Kansas, and
the "selection essential" only for the Circuit Court of Jefferson
County in Birmingham, Alabama.
In the 1960's, nine states have adopted the three essentials
listed above for the selection of most if not all of their judiciary.
Alaska, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Vermont fill all of their state
judiciary vacancies by the Merit Plan. In Iowa, Nebraska, New
12. Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418-435 (1913).
13. REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, 39TH LEGISLATrVE AS-
SEMBLY 46 (1965); ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK: THE IMPROVE-
MENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 46 (5th ed. Stevens ed. 1971).
14. ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK: THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 45 (5th ed. Stevens ed. 1971); Address by Obert C. Teigen,
associate Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court to the North Dakota Constitutional Con-
vention's Committee on Judicial Fulnctions and Political Subdivisions, August 30, 1971.
Variations of these three "essentials" are found in some states, but even then, the con-
cept of each "essential" is included in the variations.
15. The Merit Plan was not adopted for all of the appellate and trial bench of Mis-
souri because It was feared that the rural voters would not support such a plan for the
rural districts. Thus, country voters were assured that by supporting the Merit Plan, the
political 0orruption would be "cleaned up" in the big cities without affecting their local
courts. However, the Merit Plan may be adopted in these areas by local option vote
although it has never been exercised. Winters, Judicial Selection and Tenure, in SELECTED
READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 35 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
330 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Mexico, Idaho, and Utah appointment of judges are made in all
but the minor courts. 6
The last decade also found North Dakotans attempting to adopt
the Merit Plan of judicial selection.17 Primarily through the efforts
of the North Dakota Bar Association, the 1965 North Dakota Legis-
lative Assembly passed a resolution to provide for an amendment
to the North Dakota Constitution s calling for a change in the
selection of judges from the present non-partisan elective method
to an appointive-elective system.'9 The proposed constitutional
16. Other states using the Merit Plan of selection are California for judges of the
supreme court and appellate courts, Louisiana for judges of certain lower courts such
as New Orleans Traffic Court, Georgia for the Atlantic Traffic Court, New York for
the New York City Courts which is done under the mayor's appointive power, Alabama
for the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, and Florida for the Metropolitan Court of
Dade County. States adopting just the "tenure essential" of the Merit Plan, the periodic
non-competitive election, are Pennsylvania (state-wide courts) and Illinois (general trial
courts). Added to this, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico fills all judicial vacancies by
appointment. Thus, at the present time, there are 21 states which use all or part of the
Merit Plan for judicial selection. BooK OF THE STATES: 1970-1971, at 120, 124, 125 (1971) ;
Winters, Improved Methods of Selecting Judges, ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,
HANDBOOK: THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 48 (5th ed. Stevens ed.
1971). According to this American Bar Association publication, the provision in the
various states enacting part or all of the Merit Plan came into being by:
[Constitutional] authority in Missouri, Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Iowa, Neb-
raska, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, Illinois, and Pennsylvania; by statute in Mary-
land, Louisiana, Georgia, and Vermont; by executive action in Puerto Rico,
New Mexico, and New York; and by County Charter in Dade County, Florida.
In California merit tenure and in Oklahoma both selection and tenure for
appellate courts was under constitutional authority, while selection for all
other courts in Oklahoma was by executive action of the governor.
17. In 1960, the State Bar Association of North Dakota established a special Judicial
Selection and Tenure Committee to study the Merit Plan. This committee was merged
with the Judiciary Committee of the State Bar Association of North Dakota into the
Judicial Improvement Committee in 1962. After meeting to consider different selection
proposals, this Judicial Improvement Committee recommended adoption of a Merit Selec-
tion and Tenure Plan. Following this recommendation, the members of the State Bar
Association adopted a resolution advocating adoption of a Merit Plan at their annual
meeting in 1963. The enthusiasm of the Bar Association for the Merit Plan resulted in
their sponsoring a North Dakota Citizen's Conference on Judicial Selection and Tenure in
1964. A proposed constitutional amendment for Merit Selection which was drafted by
the Juricial Improvement Committee was discussed at the conference. NORTH DAKOTA
BAR AssociATIow, NORTH DAKOTA CITIZEN'S CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 13, 28-29 (1964).
18. N.D. CoNs1. art. IV, § 90, provides as follows:
The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by the qualified electors
of the state at general elections. The term of Office shall be ten years and
the judges shall hold their offices until their successors are duly qualified
and shall receive such compensation for their services as may be prescribed
by law. Provided that this section shall not be applicable to the terms of
office of judges of the supreme court elected prior to the general election of
the year 1934, at which election three supreme court judges shall be chosen;
and the candidate at said election receiving the highest number of votes
shall be chosen; and the candidate at said election receiving the highest
number of votes shall be elected for a term of ten years, the candidate re-
ceiving the next highest number of votes shall be elected for a term of eight
years and the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes shall be
elected for a term of six years.
N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 104, which provided for the election of district judges, would also
have been amended by this resolution of the 1965 North Dakota Legislature.
19. N.D. SEss. LAwS ch. 481 (1965). The proposed constitutional amendment was
drafted by the Legislative Research Committee, REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMITTEE, 39TH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMELY 45, 46 (1965). It appeared on the November 8,
1966 ballot as follows:
1.) Amendment. Section 90 of the Constitution of the State of North
Dakota is hereby amended and reenacted to read as follows:
NOTES 331
amendment was put to the voters of North Dakota in the election
of November 8, 1966, and was defeated by 9,413 votes. 20 Another
attempt was made in 1968 as the 1967 legislature submitted basically
the same resolution to the voters in the primary election of Septem-
ber 3, 1968.21 Again, the proposed amendment was defeated, this
time by a larger margin.2 2 The issue continues to be a subject
Section 90. A vacancy as defined by the law occurring in the office
of Judge of the Supreme Court or District Court shall be filled by the Gov-
ernor from a list of three nominees presented to him by the judicial nomi-
nating commission. If the Governor shall fail to make an appointment
from the list within thirty days from the day it is presented to him, the
appointment shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from
the same list within fifteen days. At the next general election after the
expiration of three years from the date of appointment and every ten years
thereafter, Judges of the Supreme Court shall be subject to approval by a
majority vote of the electorate voting upon the question. At the next general
election after the expiration of three years from the date of appointment
and every six years thereafter, Judges of the District Courts shall be sub-
Ject to approval by a majority vote of the electorate voting upon the ques-
tion. In the case of a Judge of the Supreme Court the electorate of the
state shall vote on the question of approval. In the case of a Judge of the
District Court, only the electorate of that Judicial district shall vote on
the question of approval. The Chief Justice shall be selected as provided
by law. All Judges shall hold their offices until their successors are duly
qualified and shall receive such compensation for their services as may be
prescribed by law.
There shall be a judicial nominating commission which shall select
the nominees for appointment to the office of Judge of the Supreme Court
and District Courts. The membership of such commission shall consist of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman; one
member of the North Dakota state bar association from each judicial dis-
trict, who shall be appointed by such association; and one citizen, not a
member of the bar, appointed by the Governor for staggered terms of six
years from each judicial district. No member of the judicial nominating
commission appointed by the Governor shall hold an elective office in the
state, federal, or county governments.
2.) The Constitution of the state of North Dakota shall be amended
by adding thereto the following section:
Any person elected or appointed to an office of Judge of the Supreme
Court or District Court of this state prior to the effective date of Section
90 of the North Dakota Constitution, as amended at the general election
held In November, 1966, shall serve the term for which he was elected or
appointed and shall be eligible to succeed himself for reelection by sub-
mitting his name to the electorate for approval or rejection as Provided by
law and this Constitution unless he shall die, resign, or be removed from
office prior to the expiration of his term, whereupon the office shall be
filled as prescribed by law and this Constitution.
20. OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST AT THE GENERAL ELECTION III- NOVEMBER 8,
1966 (Secretary of State's Office, Bismarck, North Dakota).
21. N.D. SEss. LAws ch. 517 (1967). This constitutional amendment was more compre-
hensive than the 1965 proposal as it dealt with two whole judiciary sections of the
North Dakota Constitution. Briefly, it provided:
[Flor the amendment of sections 85, 90, 94, and the powers of the judiciary,
changing the selection of judges from an elective to an appointive-elective
system, preserving the tenure of judges presently In office and those who
would take office prior to the effective date of this amendment; to provide
for the retirement, discipline and removal of supreme and district court
judges; to provide for requirements to declare a law unconstitutional; pro-
viding for judicial districts, judicial council, and to repeal sections 88, 89,
92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114,
115, 116, 117, and 118, relating to procedurqs of state courts, all of such
sections amended and repealed being a part of the Constitution of the state
of North Dakota.
22. In the primary election of September 3, 1968, the margin of disapproval was
12,304 votes. OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF THE VOTES CAST AT THE PRIMARY ELECTION HELD
SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 (Secretary of State's Office, Bismarck, North Dakota).
One of the primary reasons given by the North Dakota Bar Association
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of debate for North Dakota citizens.2 8
ELECTION vs. APPOINTMENT
The nominating commission is regarded as the most important
aspect of the Merit Plan, or appointment method. The primary
purpose of the commission is to give extensive consideration to
a judicial candidate's ability and character in order to give the
governor or elected official making the appointment a list of the
best qualified candidates available. However, proponents of the elect-
ive system argue that the appointive method allows the governor
to choose the least qualified judicial candidate from the list of
nominees submitted by the nominating commission.2 4 Yet appointive
advocates contend they do not believe a governor can appoint "a
least qualified judicial candidate" because the nominees are the
best from a group of candidates that already contains well-qualified
candidates.25 Furthermore, the advocates of the Merit Plan assert
that the result is better qualified judges because the nominating
commissions are better able to judge the abilities and qualities
needed for judges than the electorate. Lawyers and judges are
on the nominating commissions and by the very nature of their
profession, they should be able to evaluate legal ability and talent
better than the average layman.
2
On the other hand, proponents of an elective system contend
that the nominating commission deprives the right of the people
to choose the judiciary-that by substituting an appointive for an
elective method an erosion of the processes of free government
occurs.2 7 However, it is questionable whether an elective method
really provides the people with a choice. In North Dakota, any
vacancy on the supreme court caused by "death, resignation, or
otherwise," is filled by appointment by the governor, with such
for the defeat of the proposed constitutional amendments during the 1966 and 1968
election was that there was very little money spent during the campaigns to support
these measures.
23. At the August 30, 1971, meetings of the North Dakota Constitutional Conven-
tion's Committee on Judicial Functions and Political Subdivisions, Judges, lawyers, and
organizations testified on the subject before the Committee. Those testifying were: Chief
justice Alvin C. Strutz, associate justice Harvey B. Knudson, William L. Paulson, and
Obert C. Teigen of the North Dakota Supreme Court; Pat Conmy, Hugh McCutcheon, and
Herman Weiss of the North Dakota State Bar Association, and Mrs. Corliss Mushik of
the League of Women Voters of North Dakota.
24. Address by the chief justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court, Alvin Strutz, to
the North Dakota Constitutional Committee on Judicial Functions and Political Subdi-
visions, August 30, 1971.
25. R. Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New York,
in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 68, 76 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
26. G. Winters, The Judicial Nominating Committee, in SELECTED READINOs: JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE 127 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
27. Address by the chief Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court, Alvin Strutz,
to the North Dakota Constitutional Convention's Committee on Judicial Functions and
Political Subdivisions, August 30, 1971.
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appointment lasting until the first general election. 2 At the present
time, two of North Dakota's five supreme court justices, and eight
of sixteen district court judges have originally taken office by
appointment.2 9 Under the Merit Plan, the governor of North Dakota
would not be able to make an appointment without restrictions
as he is able to do now. He would have to select a judicial
candidate from a panel of qualified nominees chosen by the nomi-
nating commission.
Another factor which negates the idea that the people really
have a choice by electing their judges is the number of uncontested
elections. In the last 20 years of North Dakota elections, nearly
50 per cent of the supreme court elections were not contested.
In the years from 1950 to 1970, elections for district judges were
uncontested nearly 80 per cent of the time. 0 Added to this, there
is evidence that North Dakota voters are indifferent as to the
outcome of judicial elections.8
However, under the Merit Plan, proponents contend that the
people still have a choice in judicial selection. Under the Merit
Plan, the electors still exercise their franchise as they vote by
non-political judicial ballots calling for approval or disapproval of
a judge. Instead of running against an opponent, the incumbent
judge runs on his record and if disapproved, another judge is
appointed from nominees submitted by the nominating commission.2
28. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 98; District Court vacancies are also filled by appointment
from the governor, Gunderson v. Byrne, 59 N.D. 543, 231 N.W. 862 (1930). Nationwide
statistics indicate over 56 percent of the judges in the "elective" states went on the
bench by appointment during the years of 1948-57. Winters & Allard, Two Dozen Miscon-
ceptions about Judicial Selection and Tenure, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION
AND TENURE 130, 131 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
29. REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, 39TH LEGISLA-
TIVE ASSEMBLY 47 (1965). Commenting on lower courts, this publication states:
[C]omplete information is not available on the lower court judges, but the
information that we do have indicates that the majority of the judges in
the county courts of increased jurisdiction initially took office by appoint-
ment and, in spite of a lack of figures, we know that the overwhelming ma-
jority of the county justices went into office by appointment after the of-
fice was created in the respective individual counties. We have no informa-
tion as to the number of county judges and police magistrates who have
taken office by appointment.
30. These figures were obtained from OFFICLL ABSTRACTS OF VOTEs CAST AT GENERAL
NOVEMBER ELECTIONS FROM 1950 to 1970 (Secretary of State's Office, Bismarck, North
Dakota).
31. In the 1968 general election, the judges of the Supreme Court received only 73%
of the votes cast. In the 1970 general election, the Supreme Court received about 70%
of the total vote. In the district judge elections in 1970, as few as 65% of the voters of
one of North Dakota's districts voted for a judge. OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST AT
THE GENERAL ELECTION HELD NOvEMBER 5, 1968 & OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST AT
THE GENERAL ELECTION HELD NovEMBER 3, 1970 (Secretary of State's Office, Bismarck,
North Dakota). See also Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, in SELECTED
READINGS: JUDICIAL SELCTION AND TENURE 108, 113 (G. Winters ed. 1967); Winters &
Allard, Two Dozen Misconceptions about Judicial Selection and Tenure, in SELECTED READ-
INGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 130, 132 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
32. The type of ballot is usually as follows:
"Shall Judge
(Here the name of the judge shall be inserted)
(Here the title of the court shall be inserted)
of the be re-
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Chief Justice Alvin C. Strutz, of the North Dakota Supreme Court,
criticizes this reasoning:
If the people are not competent to elect a man as judge
under our present system, how in the name of common sense
will they be any more competent to pass on a judge's right
to be retained after he has served for three years in office?
Remember: When a judge's name appears on the ballot and
the people are asked to retain or reject him, they have no
idea who is going to take his place if he is rejected. The
tendency would be for the electorate to feel that they might
get an even worse judge than the one whose name appears
on the ballot, and therefore they would be inclined to vote
for his retention.
3 3
Chief Justice Strutz indicates that the Merit Plan gives the
judge life tenure, causing an over-complacent judiciary. However,
Merit Plan advocates argue that possible life tenure has a favor-
able consequence on a judge's behavior. The result is that it gives
a judge independence permitting him to make a decision based
on the merits of the case, rather than being subjected to outside
pressures confronting an elected judge.3 4 Even if a judge becomes
arbitrary in his treatment of lawyers and judges before the court
because of possible life tenure, the voters still have the power to
remove him. Although it is true that removal rarely occurs,3 5 this
problem can be avoided by placing the emphasis on judicial selec-
tion and thereby preventing unqualified judges from getting on the
bench in the first place.36
One of the primary contentions of the supporters of the Merit
Plan is that it takes the courts out of politics. Although it is
conceded that it is impossible to remove judicial selection entirely
from politics, it should be the goal to remove it as far as possible.
Election advocates answer that Bar politics is substituted for the
politics of a campaign. They defend their claim on the grounds
that the bar has too great an influence on the selection of judges.
37
But it is important to note that the nominating commission is
made up of laymen who have as much authority on the commis-
tained in office? Yes C No [] (Mark an X in the box you pre-
fer.)" Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 29(c)(1).
33. Address by the chief justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court, Alvin Strutz,
to the North Dakota Constitutional Convention's Committee on Judicial Functions and
Political Subdivisions, August 30, 1971.
34. R. WATSON & R. DOWNINO, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 346 (1969).
35. Id. at 345. However, removal has been accomplished by the Missouri voters.
36. Roscoe Pound has stated, "Too much thought has been given to the matter of
getting less qualified judges off the bench. The real remedy Is not to put them on." Pound,
Introduction to E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES XiV (1944).
37. Harding, The Case For Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A-B.A.J. 1162, 1163 (1969).
This article also indicates that judges are in fact "partisan political officers vested with
political authority whose use is affected by partisan dispositions." Because judges formu-
late public policy, they "should and must conform to the will of the people."
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sion as a lawyer or judge. In fact, studies of nominating commis-
sions indicate that laymen have sufficient confidence, as well as
independence, and are not influenced by the bar. Furthermore, it
appears attorneys have been conscientious in making honest ap-
praisals of the candidates. 8
In most states the nominating commission is composed of an
equal number of laymen and lawyers with an appellate judge pre-
siding as chairman. 9 Variations in the composure of the nominat-
ing commission are exemplified by Colorado which provides for
the laymen to be a majority on the commission 40 and Kansas
which prevents any judge from being a member of the commission.4 1
Selection of the nominating commission members also varies
as many combinations have been advocated. Lawyers have been
appointed by state officials, 42 elected by the bar members in each
congressional district 43 or elected by the state bar association
at large. 44 Laymen are usually appointed by the governor.4 5 In
addition, the terms of the members are usually staggered and
no voting member of the commission is allowed to hold political
office.
46
Another contention by Merit Plan advocates is that the neces-
sity of a political campaign under the elective method poses many
problems for a judicial candidate. In a small state like North
Dakota, if a considerable amount of money is spent by the candi-
date on publicity, he could reach most of the voters. It is the
wealthier judicial candidate who will have the advantage. Not only
would the Merit Plan eliminate this problem, but it would also
give judges the opportunity to spend more time on judicial matters.
The result would be the promotion of court efficiency and the
acceleration of the administration of justice.
4 7
The appointment advocates also point out that although a judge
may be better qualified than his opponent, he may be defeated
because he is not a skilled campaigner. Added to this, many
38. Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New York, in
SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 68, 75 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
39. See also Ballot, supra note 19. The proposed constitutional amendments In North
Dakota provided for a commission membership of the chief justice of the Supreme Court
as chairman, with lawyers and laymen from each Judicial district being appointed by
the State Bar Association and the governor respectively. There are six judicial districts
in North Dakota.
40. COLO. CON ST. art VI, § 24(2)(3).
41. KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 2(f)(4).
42. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24(4).
43. KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 2(f)(2).
44. KIAN. CONST. art. 3, § 2(f) (2).
45. MO. CONST. art. 5, § 29(d).
46. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24(2)(4).
47. The executive director of the American Judicature Society comments on this prob-
lem by saying, "These activities, and the election campaign Itself, deprive the litigants and
the taxpayers of time that should be spent in judicial work." Winters, Improved Methods
of Selecting Judges, in ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK: THE IM-
PROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 44, 45 (5th ed. Stevens ed. 1971).
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lawyers will not give up the practice of law because of the risk
of defeat which could in turn have an adverse effect on a reputable
private practice built up over many years. The field of choice
between candidates is narrowed considerably because of these de-
terrents. A nominating commission would consider all candidates
and their qualifications regardless of whether or not they had the
characteristics necessary to impress the electorate.
48
Probably the most serious problem facing judicial candidates in
a political campaign is ethical in nature. Campaigns cost money and
require management and assistance from members of the bar or
friends. The impartial attitude needed by a judge in the administra-
tion of justice becomes suspect when contributors of money or work
appear before this judge in court as either attorneys or litigants.
Judicial Canon 32 reads as follows: "A judge should not accept
any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practicing be-
for him or from others whose interests are likely to be submitted to
him for judgment."' 9 This canon can be circumvented by directing
gifts to a committee, not to the judge himself. Yet the judicial can-
didate obviously knows who has given him contributions and that
these contributions will be used for his benefit. Query, how can a
judge remain free from influence and refrain from incurring obli-
gations?
Judicial Canon 30 raises a related problem:
If a judge becomes a candidate for any judicial office,
he should refrain from all conduct which might tend to arouse
reasonable suspicion that he is using the power or pres-
tige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy or the
success of his party.
He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of
his candidacy which would reasonably lead to such suspicion.50
Friends and campaign workers may insist on doing work for a
judge during his campaign which involves using the judicial office
to further his candidacy. It seems natural that the judicial candidate
running for re-election would be advertised by campaign workers as
a "judge" having experience, and as a "judge" who has fulfilled the
duties of his office remarkably well. The practical necessities of a
democratic election seem to outweigh professional 'ethics.
Other problems are created with Judicial Canon 12 which pre-
vents patronage in appointing "[t] rustees, receivers, masters, ...
48. Address by Obert C. Teigen, associate Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court to the
North Dakota Constitutional Convention's Committee on Judicial Functions and Political
Subdivisions, August 30, 1971.
49. ABA CAONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 32.
50. ABA C.&ANsT 9F JuocICPN. 0
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and other persons . . . to aid in the administration of justice. . .
Although it is human instinct to award active campaign supporters,
these appointments must be made with "the strictest probity and im-
partiality and should be selected with a view solely to their character
and fitness. The power of making such appointments should not be
exercised by him for personal or partisan.. . ..." reasons. 2 Query, is
this practical in the climate and aftermath of a political campaign?
One writer, commenting on the above ethical problems, has ob-
served:
It is unfortunately plain ... that even the most ethically
conducted campaign involves a series of exceptions to the
canons which warp their spirit and which add nothing to the
public respect for our judicial system. . . . As long as a
judge's campaign committee must accept gifts of money and
work from lawyers, there will be gnawing doubts as to his
freedom from influence and bias. 3
CONCLUSION
A recent study of the Missouri Merit Plan indicates that ,both
lawyers and judges believe it has resulted in putting better judges
on the bench. Furthermore, judges selected under the Merit Plan in
Missouri were given a higher "performance rating" than those sel-
ected through election. The outstanding fact of this study established
that the Merit Plan in Missouri has tended to exclude "highly incom-
petent persons" from the state judiciary.
54
The results of the Merit Plan in states like Missouri which have
had the appointment method for 30 years may provide an incentive
to adopt the Merit Plan in North Dakota. Although it is true there
is no actual proof of which method provides the best judges, it should
be evident after the discussion of the merits of the two methods that
several problems with the elective method are removed and that
better judges should be chosen under the merit system, whether it
be from a common-sense or theoretical point of view.
That better judges can be chosen by having judicial representa-
tion on a nominating commission is apparent. Lawyers should know
51. ABA CANONS or JUDICIAL ETHIcs No. 12.
52. Id.
53. Anderson, Ethical Problems of Lawyers and Judges in Election Campaigns, 50
A.B.A.J. 819, 823 (1964). Another writer states: "Judges in elective states are obliged to
engage in political activities and to seek publicity for themselves in ways that prejudice
their judicial independence and demean the judicial office." Winters, Improved Methods
of Selecting Judges, ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. HANDBOOK: THE IMPROVE-
MENT OF THE ADmINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 44, 45 (5th ed. Stevens ed. 1971).
54. Specifically, six out of every eight attorneys practicing in the two major cities of
Missouri sustained the above conclusion. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE
BENCH AND BAR 345 (1969) ; A study of the Texas judiciary also indicates that lawyers
and Judges think the quality of judges is better under an appointive method. B. HENDER-
SON & T. SINCLAIR, THE SELECTION OF JUDGES IN TEXAS: AN EyPLORATORY STUDY 103-118
(1965).
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which persons are best qualified for judicial service. If a farmer or
rancher in North Dakota were being selected to represent agricultural
interests on a policy and decision making board, would it not be a
good idea to have farmers and ranchers assisting in the selection
of this individual? But it is also agreed that purely technical skills
are not the only considerations that should be evaluated. Thus, the
Merit Plan provides for the broader viewpoint of laymen on the non-
legal considerations of general intelligence, education, personal in-
tegrity and the more human qualities which are as essential for
selecting the best judges as are evaluations of professional skills by
attorneys.
Alvin C. Strutz, chief justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court,
when commenting on North Dakota's present elective method of se-
lection has said, "This system has worked very well, and we have
had absolutely no scandal in our courts since statehood. ' 15 Although
it may be true that our present North Dakota selection method has
worked "well" in the past, it should be incumbent upon the North
Dakota Constitutional Convention to adopt a plan of selection that
would obtain the best qualified judges available-not just something
that has worked "well."
Not only would the best judges be selected for our state judiciary
by adopting the Merit Plan, but present problems with our existing
method of selection would be eliminated. Under the present 'North
Dakota Constitution, the Governor is able to make appointments in
the case of a vacancy by death or resignation, without any restric-
tions or recommendations. The number of uncontested judicial elec-
tions and lack of voter interest indicate that the people do not really
have a choice under the elective method. The drafters of the North
Dakota Constitution could curb the present problems and guarantee
our citizens against possible future problems that could be disastrous
by adopting the Merit Plan of judicial selection.56
55. Address by chief justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court, Alvin Strutz, to the
North Dakota Constitutional Convention's Committee on Judicial Functions and Political
Subdivisions, August 30, 1971.
56. Future problems proving disasterous can be visualized by noting the primary fac-
tors causing the first states to adopt the Merit Plan-these factors being political corr-
ruption of the Judiciary and ineffective administration of Justice under the elective meth-
od. Hyde, The Missouri Method of Choosing Judges, 41 J.AM. Jun. Soc'y. 74 (1957) ; Hall
& Schroeder, 25 Years' Experience With Merit Judicial Section in Missouri, 44, TEx. L.
REV. 1088, 1093 (1966).
Proponents of North Dakota's nonpartisan election ballot for the judiciary con-
tend that it is only states with partisan ballots for the judiciary where political cor-
ruption occurs. The Executive Director of the American Judicature Society, however,
feels that the nonpartisan election may be worse than the partisan election of the ju-
diciary. He states:
[While] nonpartisan election does indeed eliminate some of the evils of
partisan election, it is still highly political, and it still emphasizes non-
Judicial rather than Judicial qualifications, as a basis for selection. In one
respect it is worse than partisan elections in that It actually makes it
possible for a candidate to get ls name on the ballot who has to commend
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All three essentials of the Merit Plan should be adopted in North
Dakota for the selection of judges in the North Dakota Supreme
Court and the North Dakota District Courts. The only variations nec-
essary are that the nominating commission should be composed of
more laymen than lawyers and that a judge should not be the chair-
man of the nominating commission. This would eliminate the oppor-
tunity for critics to charge that the Merit Plan leaves the selection
of judges entirely to the State Bar Association or that lawyers and
judges would dominate a nominating commission even though lay-
men are represented.5
7
A problem with advocating the adoption of the Merit Plan in
North Dakota is that some North Dakota politicians have indicated
that they will do everything possible to defeat the newly adopted
constitution if any of the present elective positions are changed to
appointment.58 If this is a deterrent to the delegates of the Constitu-
tional Convention in changing existing method of selection, the con-
stitution could at least allow for the selection method to be changed
by the legislature from existing non-partisan election method to the
Merit Plan of judicial selection including all three "essentials" and
variations mentioned in the preceding paragraph.5 9  Flexibility
him, but his own ambition and perhaps his inability to make a living as a
lawyer, and whom no political party would be willing to sponsor.
Winters, Improved Methods of Selecting Judges, in ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMIN-
ISTRATION, HAND1OOK: THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 45 (5th ed.
Stevens ed. 1971).
57. An additional reason for not allowing a judge to be chairman of the nominating
commission Is that laymen tend to give the judge an "aura" because of his position and
lawyers may refrain from disagreeing with a judge because it may jeopardize their re-
lationship and adversely affect the lawyer the next time he is in the judge's court.
58. Grand Forks Herald, July 24, 1971, at 1, col. 4. This article states the following:
Referral leader Robert P. McCarney, long a thorn in the side of the North
Dakota legislature, threatened Friday to campaign against adoption of a
new constitution for the state.
McCarney told a newsman he would wage such a campaign if the Consti-
tutional Convention proposes a revision which would convert any state elec-
tive position to appointive ones.
"If the Constitutional Convention tries to put in appointive positions, I'll
campaign all over to kill that constitution," he said.
State Senator George Longmire (R-Grand Forks) acknowledges this problem:
"Appointment of judges has much merit. However, the majority of people in North Da-
kota probably aren't willing to give up their right of electing judges." The Dakota Stu-
dent, October 5, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
59. Proposals have been made to the North Dakota Constitutional Convention's Com-
mittee on Judicial Functions and Political Subdivisions which would allow the legislature
to change the method of judicial selection by statute. A constitutional amendment would
not be necessary. Proposals made to the committee are the Gefreh Proposal, by Judge
Gefreh, and Committee Working Draft No. 2. Section 5 of the Gefreh Proposal is as fol-
lows:
Any vacancy happening by death, resignation or otherwise in the office of
judge of the supreme court or the district court shall be filled by appoint-
ment, by the governor from a list of three nominees offered by a judicial
nominating committee as constituted and prescribed by the legislature,
which appointment shall continue until the first general election thereafter,
when said vacancy shall be filled by election unless a different mode of
selection shall have been provided by the legislature.
Section 3 of the Committee Working Draft No. 2 provides for the election or appointment
of District Judges:
As provided by law, the state shall be divided into Judicial districts in each
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would be accomplished by allowing the legislature to make the
changes if unhealthy circumstances arose in the judiciary of our
state. The long procedure and campaigns required by a constitutional
amendment at the present time would not be necessary and the leg-
islature could make the change to an appointment method during the
next legislative session.
However, it is hoped that North Dakota will adopt all of the Merit
Plan essentials in their constitution and that no limitations will be
placed upon it. Twenty-one progressive states now have some or all
of the Merit Plan of selection for their judiciary. The opportunity of
merit selection presents itself-will North Dakota seize that oppor-
tunity?
JOHN W. DWYER
of which shall be elected or appointed one or more judges and In each of
which districts shall be organized functional probate, civil, criminal, Juve-
nile, and such other divisions and such administrative offices of such court
as may be provided by law or rule.
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